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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BARBARA ANN PAINTER, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JAMES RANDALL PAINTER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRlIEF OF RESPONDENT 
CiVil No. 870317-CA 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3g (1987). 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Plaintiff-Respondent, Barbara Ann Painter 
(hereinafter "Plaintiff") , filed a C|omplaint against the 
Defendant-Appellant, James Randall Painter (hereinafter 
"Defendant"), seeking a divorce (R. 105). The Defendant filed 
an Answer and Counterclaim (R. 20-23, 20^-209). 
This appeal is from an order, entered in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court of Juab County on the 25th of June, 
1987, granting to the Plaintiff a Decree of Divorce from the 
Defendant (R. 283-287). Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal as 
directed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on the 23rd of 
July, 1987 (R. 290-291). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant are and have been 
residents of Juab County, State of Utah, for a period in excess 
of three months prior to filing this action. 
2. The parties were married each to the other on 
April 23, 1968 in Nephi, Utah and separated in March of 1986. 
3. There have been born as issue of this marriage 
four minor children, to wit; Aaron Painter, Mario Painter, 
Benjamin Painter, and MeLea Painter 
4. Plaintiff was awarded custody and control of the 
two youngest children of the parties and joint custody of the 
two older boys. 
5. Plaintiff and Defendant were awarded joint custody 
of Aaron and Mario with the principal place of residence being 
with Plaintiff. Aaron and Mario to live six months of the year 
with Defendant so long as both parties continue to reside in 
Nephi, Utah. Should either party move from Nephi, Utah then in 
such event the Plaintiff shall have the custody of Aaron and 
Mario. 
6. Defendant is an able-bodied person and is employed 
by Painter Motor Company and earns in excess of $2,000 per 
month. 
7. Plaintiff is employed on a part-time basis and 
earns approximately $200 per month. 
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8. Defendant was ordered to pay child support at the 
rate of $160 per month per child for the children in 
Plaintiff's care and custody. Defendant was excused from 
paying the child support for Aaron and Mario during the six 
months he has them in his custody. 
9. Defendant is able to provide health and accident 
insurance on the minor children and he Vas ordered to maintain 
the same. 
10. Plaintiff was awarded alimony in the sum of $450 
per month. 
11. Defendant was to pay all of the obligations 
incurred during the marriage except that obligation due or to 
become due on the mortgage on the family home. 
12. Each party was awarded on^-half of the present 
equity in the family home. 
13. The Painter Family LimitecJ Partnership and the 
Painter Motor Company stock interest was awarded to Defendant. 
14. The motorcycles used by the children of the 
parties were awarded to the children. 
15. The Court entered a restraining order dated March 
18, 1986 which restrained both parties from "disposing of any 
of the real property, personal property# business property or 
investment property, money or funds belonging to the parties . 
. ." Defendant has violated the terms ok that order by making 
payment to Zions First National Banl^  in the amount of 
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$15f460.27 in payment of a business loan; a payment to Painter 
Motor of $3,085.08 for a pay advance; a payment in the amount 
of $1,622.48 to Painter Motor Insurance; a payment to First 
Security Bank of $1,589.87 and the purchase of Honda 
motorcycles in the amount of $2,456.28. Defendant 
appropriately made payments to IRS and the State Tax 
Commission. The parties had accumulated $36,688 in a 
retirement fund from which Defendant made the unauthorized 
payments. There should have been $32,950.59 remaining in the 
account. Plaintiff should be entitled to $16,475.30 of the 
retirement account. There remains $8,736.51 of these funds. 
Plaintiff was therefore awarded the $8,736.51 in cash remaining 
from the retirement account and the lot valued at $7,000 to 
compensate her for the unauthorized expenditures. 
16. The remaining lot valued at $6,000 was to be 
placed for sale immediately and the proceeds therefrom divided 
equally. 
17. The 1983 Riviera automobile was awarded to 
Plaintiff, and Defendant was required to make whatever payment 
arrangements were necessary with Painter Motor Company in order 
to secure clear title to the Plaintiff. 
18. The household furnishings were divided equally by 
the parties. 
19. It was apparent from the testimony and evidence 
presented at trial that the Defendant has substantial income 
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benefits other than those reported td the Internal Revenue 
Service for tax purposes. The Court has taken into account 
that disparity in making its findings and the property division 
and further in making the support provisions as herein set 
forth. 
SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT 
i 
Point I 
The Trial Court considered all of the evidence 
including the debts, the assets, and the respective earning 
capacities of the parties in making ar equitable division of 
property and in the award of alimony anc child support. 
The Defendant simply reargues his position at the 
Trial Court level which position was Appropriately rejected. 
Defendant's entire testimony is suspect because of inconsistent 
statements. His testimony is unbelievable and was rejected in 
part by the Trial Court. No substantiation exists to support: 
a. The "Zions loan" of $15,460; 
b. The requirement to repav "advances" to Painter 
Motor Co.; 
c. The requirement to repay the "Painter 
Insurance Loan." 
Yet extensive evidence exists disclosing Defendant's 
earnings beyond that stated under oath. The convenient use of 
Painter Motor Co. as an "alter-ego" whenever it is and was to 
the advantage of Defendant. 
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Point II 
There was an equitable distribution of the marital 
assets. An examination of the total marital estate and its 
distribution discloses that each party was awarded 
approximately one-half. There is a decided distortion in 
Defendant's favor if the Limited Partnership and Painter Motor 
stock interest are deemed marital assets. Only in the mind of 
Defendant is there any disparity. 
Point III 
The Trial Court looked beyond "parental pressures" on 
both sides and simply interviewed the two oldest children out 
of the presence of the parties and counsel. These interviews, 
together with the evidence submitted by the respective parties, 
formed the basis of the custodial order. No one has been 
deprived of any "due process of law." 
Point IV 
The free interchange of the assets of Painter Motor 
and the parties failed to mislead the Trial Court. The 
distribution of equal parts of the marital estate is 
appropriate and sustainable. 
Point V 
Plaintiff should be awarded her attorney's fees and 
costs in defending this Appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CONSIDERED THE DEBTS
 r 
ASSETS, AND RESPECTIVE EARNING RAPACITIES OF 
THE PARTIES. 
The scope of review by th£ Appellate Court is 
succinctly stated in Gill v. Gill, 718 P.2d 779 (Utah 1986) 
wherein the Supreme Court declared at page 780: 
The long-recognized and oft-repeated 
standard of appellate review permits this 
Court to overturn the judgment of the trial 
court only when the evidence clearly 
preponderates to the contrary or the trial 
court has abused its discretion or 
misapplied principles of law. In adjusting 
the financial and property interest of 
parties to divorce, the trial court is 
afforded considerable discretion, and its 
actions are cloaked with a presumption of 
validity (citations omitted). 
The Defendant has failed to show or even allude to any 
preponderance of evidence contrary to the Court's ruling or 
that the Trial Court abused its discretion. 
The Trial Court specifically f^ und in its Memorandum 
Decision, paragraph 8: 
It is apparent from the testimony and 
evidence presented at trial that the 
defendant has substantial income benefits 
other than those reported to Ithe Internal 
Revenue Service for tax purposes. The court 
has taken into account that disparity in 
making the above-mentioned property division 
and further in making the support provisions 
as set forth above. 
The evidence elicited at trial consists in part of the 
unrebutted testimony of Plaintiff in the following specifics: 
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Q: How did you handle the financial 
matters during the term of your marriage 
before the separation? 
A: He would give me his check and I 
would deposit the entire check into my 
checking account and then it was my job to 
take care of all the household expenses and 
take care of the needs of the children and 
myself. 
Q: Now in addition to those items did 
Mr. Painter have other monies with which to 
utilize and benefit the family with? 
A: Yes. 
Q: What were some of the things he 
would do during this time? 
A: He went on many trips. 
Q: Did he ever ask you for funds for 
those trips? 
A: No, never. 
Q: As I understand it, you told us his 
total check would be given to you, is that 
correct? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Did he take the family out for 
dinners and that sort of thing from 
time-to-time? 
A: Yes, the last two years he has 
taken us to — well, we ate out 
approximately twice a week either to a 
drive-in or the restaurant and he took us to 
Orem shopping and to movies and to dinners. 
Q: Did he ever ask you for money for 
that period? 
A: No. 
* * * 
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Q: What does Exhibit 8 purport to be? 
A: Monthly household expenses for 
1985. 
Q: Now why did you choose the year '85 
as opposed to any other period? 
A: I felt that it gave a more true 
picture of how we were living, what style we 
were living on. 1986 was the year that my 
husband left home and my income dropped 
considerably for half of that year. 
An examination of Exhibit 8 discloses actual expenditures 
$2f013 per month. When cross examined at pages 335 and 336 
the record, Plaintiff responded: 
Q: What was Mr. Painterie ^otal check 
that you received every month? 
It was $1,543.00. 
That was the net check, correct? 
Yes. 
How big was your check^ 
It varied. 
The most it ever was was in 
approximately the $200 range, is that true? 
A: That is probably tru£. I would 
have to look at this tax form. 
Q: So the money that you had at your 
disposal, his check of fifteen hundred and 
two hundred you applied toward the monthly 
living expenses? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Do you have any explanation why you 
list down total expenses are $2,013 and he 
only gave you fifteen and you had an 
additional two? 
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A: Yes, I can explain. He gave me 
cash. 
Q: How often did he do that? 
A: Quite frequently, and he paid for 
the childrens1 school lunch and any expenses 
that they might have, such as golf lessons 
and going to the 7-Eleven stores, things 
like that. They would ask their dad for the 
money and he would give them cash. 
Defendant is an officer, director and key employee of 
Painter Motor. He historically has received a number of 
"benefits" which have been available to other key employees and 
family members. 
The parties1 lifestyle had not changed until the 
separation. From the date of separation, the lifestyle of 
Defendant was increased and all the while Defendant paid 
support to Plaintiff and the children in the amount of $444 per 
month and the house payment of $335. Defendant's business 
activities above and beyond his "$2,000 salary" over a period 
of fifteen months of separation allowed him to do the otherwise 
impossible. 
Defendant asserts his take-home pay is $1,543 per 
month. From that amount he paid the following: 
a. $444 to Plaintiff per month for a total of 
$6,660; 
b. $335 house payment for a total of $5,360; 
c. Purchased motorcycles costing $5,100 (R. 376); 
d. Paid his own living expenses; 
-10-
e. Traveled with his song a total of not less 
than 56 days on the "racing circuit." 
f. An analysis of Exhibits 21 and 30 disclose: 
1. June '86 expenditures for racing $739; 
2. July '86 expenditures for racing $662; 
3. March '87 expenditures for racing $482; 
for an average per month of $6^7 or a total of $9,405 
for racing activities. 
Defendant had a total of $23,145 Itake-home pay during 
separation. He paid out: 
a. Support $ 6,660 
b. House payments 5,360 
c. Motorcycle purchases 5,100 
d. Travel and circuit expenses 9,405 
Total $26,525 
Plus he paid his own living expenses. defendant testified in 
his deposition that his monthly living expenses were $700 
(Deposition, page 90), and at trial he testified of $1,205 per 
month (R. 395-396). If his expenses were $700 for the 15 
months, it would equal $10,500. If the figure of $10,500 is 
utilized in the living expenses, Defendant somehow managed to 
pay total expenses of $37,025 with $23,14fe earnings. There was 
no testimony of any liabilities except thfe Mastercard statement 
of $1,200 (Exhibit 30). 
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Defendant did admit in testimony that he had expended 
some $lf800 to $2f000 on racing activities. There is 
documented evidence of June and July of 1986 and March of 1987 
which totals $1,883. If one uses only "hard" figures of: 
a. Support payments of $ 6f660 
b. House payments of 5f025 
c. Defendant's living expenses 10f500 
d. Motorcycle purchases 5,100 
e. Racing expenses 1,883 
$29,168 
The credibility of Defendant is stretched beyond belief. 
Defendant testified at length of the racing trips in his 
deposition (pages 76-82) and failed to rebut the testimony of 
Plaintiff contained in Exhibit 15 detailing 56 days of trips. 
The Defendant did testify he had limited amounts of 
income from "incentives" and the sale of "old junk cars." He 
testified about this income at page 379 of the record as 
follows: 
Q: He made reference to some junk 
automobiles? 
A: Yes. That is correct. 
* * * 
A: In different intervals, depending 
on how many we have, we will sell the 
salvage off. 
Q: And your total amount? 
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A: There was a total of five hundred 
[dollars] of which I got one-third of it. I 
have two other brothers that participate on 
that. 
Q: About the incentives that you 
receive from the automobile dealership, are 
those reflected in your tax returns? 
A: If they exceed $650, I believe, I 
will receive a W-2 form. 
The foregoing analysis highlights a rule of law which 
is succinctly stated in 81 Am. Jur. 2d Witnesses § 669 as 
follows: 
There is a general principle of law that 
where a witness has testified falsely to 
some material matter in a case, his 
testimony in other respects may be 
disregarded unless it is corroborated by 
other proof. This legal principle is 
expressed in the common-law maxi[m "falsus in 
uno, falsus in omnibus," . . . 
Utah has followed this rule. See Gritt^ns v. Lundberg, 3 Ut. 
2d 392, 284 P.2d 1115. The Trial Courts as trier of fact had 
first hand observance of the demeanor of Defendant and the 
Defendant's credibility. It is obvious that the Trial Court 
has an advantaged position to hear and observe Defendant. The 
Supreme Court in Smith v. Cent. Credit Union, 727 P.2d 219 
(Utah 1986) declared at pages 220 and 221|: 
When an appellant challenges thk failure of 
the trier of fact to accept his version of 
the facts, our review is strictly limited. 
We view the evidence and its inferences in a 
light most favorable to the judgment and 
findings. They will not be disturbed when 
-13-
based upon substantial competent, admissible 
evidence. . . . When the evidence conflicts, 
we necessarily give deference to the fact 
finder and acknowledge his advantageous 
position vis-a-vis the witnesses, the 
evidence, and the parties. 
Accordingly, because the evidence is 
sufficient to support the determination of 
the court below, we do not undertake to 
reweigh the evidence or redetermine the 
facts (citations omitted). 
Defendant further testified about his debts (R. 396) 
in which there were two obligations. One to Mastercard and the 
other to Painter Motor Co. Mr. Painter testified about a loan 
application, Exhibit 22, which bears his signature. Defendant 
asserted that it was signed in blank. However, when 
questioned, he admitted he gave information orally over the 
telephone to have it "filled in." At page 351 of the record, 
Defendant testified: 
Q: Do you normally fill out blank 
statements of that nature, sir? 
A: Yes, when I am dealing with people 
that I trust. 
Q: I see. Did you give to the First 
Security Bank various information about what 
to put on Exhibit 22? 
A: Some of the information was done 
over the telephone. They needed some 
figures to fill in the blanks so it would 
pass in case there was an audit apparently. 
An examination of Exhibit 22, which is dated February 20, 1986, 
discloses that Defendant had cash of $25,000 and no debts. Yet 
later in his testimony, Defendant attempts to get the Court to 
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believe that a "loan to Zions" existed i^i June 1986. Defendant 
testified on direct at page 391: 
Q: There is an amount lifted to Zions 
Bank for $15,460.27. What was that for? 
A: That was a loan fjor a stock 
purchase on a joint venture with two of my 
other brothers in the futurejs market in 
silver and sugar. 
On cross examination, Defendant admittedt 
Q: I understand, sir, thdt on Exhibit 
29 you've indicated that you have expended 
$15,460 to Zions for a loan, is that 
correct? 
A: That is in payment of a loan, yes. 
Q: Is your wife a signaltor to that 
loan? 
A: No, she was not. 
Q: Did she have any involjvement about 
that loan? 
A: No. . . • 
Q: Have you given her any 
documentation about that loan? 
A: She never wanted to oe involved 
with it. 
Q: That wasn't my question whether she 
wanted to be involved. Did you tfive her any 
documentation? 
A: The only thing she seen was the 
statement that come from the bpnk and she 
handed that to me when it come. 
Q: Did you ever say we are|indebted to 
Zions Bank for $15,500? 
A: No, I did not. 
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Q: Do you have copies of the loan with 
Zions? 
A: I think you have the copies of 
them* 
Q: Well, I will tell you I don't have. 
A: I don't have them with me. Of 
course I don't. 
If the loan was a joint venture with Defendant's two brothers, 
why should the marital estate be responsible to repay the whole 
obligation of the joint venture? No documentation about the 
loan has ever been produced. All we have is the unverified 
testimony of the Defendant of its existence which is 
contradicted by his own statements. 
An analysis of the tax returns, Exhibit Nos. 3 and 4, 
discloses that the Defendant earned more than $2,000 gross per 
month. Yet in his deposition, he testified: 
Q: How much is that salary now? 
A: 2,000 per month. 
Q: Has it ever been more or less than 
that in the last three years? 
A: It's never been more. 
On cross examination when Defendant asserted he was required to 
repay the "advances" from Painter Motor, he testified at pages 
399 and 400: 
Q: You indicated, sir, the Painter 
Motor pay back advances, is that correct, 
for some $3,000? 
A: That is correct. 
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Q: And that is because thby supposedly 
overpaid you more than $2f000 per month that 
was your salaryf is that correct? 
A: The way that advance worked is I 
was on commission up to a certain time and I 
had drawn more than my commissions equaled 
and so I had an obligation to piy that back. 
Q: But isn't it true that your tax 
returns reflect on your W-21 the total 
amount? 
A: The tax return show the total 
amount, that is right. 
* * * 
Q: Do you recall in your deposition I 
asked you if there was ever any written 
request for a so-called payment back? 
A: There wasn't a written request. 
There was a statement. 
Q: So there has not been any written 
requests at all have there? Tfye W-2 forms 
on your tax returns, which appears as 
Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, all indicate that that 
was not an advance, but actual compensation, 
isn't that accurate? 
A: I don't know if that is accurate or 
not. 
In summaryf there is creditable and admissible 
evidence which supports the Trial Court's finding of 
substantial earnings beyond that reflected in the income tax 
returns. Since Defendant failed to conle forward with these 
earnings, then the "business loans" admittedly not disclosed to 
Plaintiff cannot be a "marital debt." 
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Assuming arguendo, that the "Zions loan," the Painter 
Motor "advance," and "insurance loan" are marital debts, there 
is no showing under the evidence in the Trial Court that the 
Trial Court abused its discretion in light of the actual 
distribution to the parties as detailed hereinafter. 
POINT II 
THE CODRT AWARDED THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
AND PAINTER MOTOR STOCK INTERESTS TO 
DEFENDANT. 
There is no showing in the evidence that the Court did not 
consider the Limited Partnership interest and the Painter Motor 
stock interest as the separate property of Defendant* 
Defendant was awarded the same. 
The assets and liabilities of the marriage may be 
summarized as follows: 
Assets Liabilities 
Home $ 76,000 Mortgage $24,409 
*Retirement Plan 32,950 Mastercard to Defendant 1,200 
Lot Next Door 7,000 Money Borrowed by 2,640 
Nebo Lot 6,000 Plaintiff 
Household Furnishings 
(No value established) 
1983 Riviera Auto 
(No value established) 
Limited Partnership 19,960 
Interest 
Painter Motor Stock 6,900 
TOTAL ASSETS $151,810 TOTAL LIABILITIES $28,249 
Plaintiff received: 
a* 1/2 of equity in Home $25,795 
b. Cash from Retirement Account 8,736 
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c. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
Lot 
1/2 of Nebo lot 
1/2 of Furniture 
Riviera Automobile 
7,000 
3,000 
-0-
unknown 
Total to Plaintiff $44 ,531 
Defendant received: 
a. 1/2 of equity in Home $25,795 
b. 1/2 of Nebo lot 3,000 
c. Limited Partnership 19,960 
d. The Painter Motor Stock 6f900 
e. 1/2 of Furniture -0-
f. Already received from Pension 
Plan 
$15,460 to Zions 
3,085 to Painter Motor 
1,622 to Painter f^ otor 
$20,167 20,167 
Total to Defendant $75,822 
^Retirement Plan was originally $36,886. The Court 
appropriately allowed offsets of IRS and State tax obligations 
totaling $3,936 for a net of $32,950. 
There was no direction about the relativ^ minor liabilities of 
each party, but Plaintiff was to pay the mortgage. 
When one examines the actual distribution to the 
respective parties and the Trial Court's prerogative to 
disbelieve the Defendant in his testimony, the distribution is 
in Defendant's favor. There can be no argument of penalty to 
Defendant for the violation of the restraining order. The 
Trial Court simply rectified the wrongful disbursements of 
Defendant of the retirement funds. 
Finally, if the distribution id examined as if the 
Limited Partnership and Painter Motor stock interests are 
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Defendant's separate property, it becomes even clearer that the 
Trial Court did not abuse its discretion. To illustrates 
Awarded to Plaintiff Awarded to Defendant 
Equity in Home 
Cash on 
Lot 
Nebo Lot 
Riviera 
TOTAL 
Hand 
If the val 
$25,795 
8,736 
7,000 
3,000 
unknown 
$44,531 
ue of 
Equity in Home 
Disbursements from 
Retirement 
Nebo Lot 
TOTAL 
the Plainti 
Plan 
ff's 
$25,795 
20,167 
3,000 
$48,962 
Riviera is 
approximately $4,431, the ledgers are absolutely equal. 
POINT III 
THE CUSTODY ORDER IS IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND 
DOES NOT VIOLATE DDE PROCESS. 
The Plaintiff testified about her abilities as a 
custodial parent as follows at pages 317 and 318: 
Q: What kind of family activities do 
you and your children engage in by way of 
recreation or otherwise? 
A: Well, lately I have been going to 
some of the weekend races with them. They 
race motorcycles. And through the years for 
entertainment we have gone camping with my 
family a lot, and I take them on picnics or 
to the park. I have taken them up north, 
oh, skating and to movies, swimming. 
Q: And what kind of relationship would 
you describe you have with your children at 
the present time? 
A: I have an excellent relationship 
with them. 
Q: Have you followed their schooling 
activities and that sort of thing 
historically through the marriage. 
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A: Yes. 
Q: Do you feel you ar^ a fit and 
proper person to have the care| custody and 
control of the minor children? 
A: Yes, I do. 
Q: You have mentioned thfct there are 
some racing activities. Tell Inae about the 
racing activities and how that i|s engaged in 
within your family unit? 
A: My three boys are involved in a 
racing program where they go every weekend, 
and the reason they go every weekend is 
because they accumulate points. That is one 
reason. Another reason i& for the 
experience of racing. They become better 
racers each time they go. 
Q: Is this an activity ofj which both 
you and your husband have approved for the 
children? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And one that you desire to continue 
in the future? 
A: Yes. 
At the conclusion of the evidence, by stipulation, the Court 
examined the two oldest children outside Of the presence of the 
parties and counsel, at the request of Plaintiff's counsel at 
pages 409 and 410 of the record: 
MR. BROWN: We would request 
specifically, because of the influence that 
we think this man has, particularly with his 
children, that the Court interview the 
children today. . . . I think that if the 
Court were to make some polite) inquiries 
into some of the areas relative to the 
contested areas of testimony that the Court 
would have a great revelation to *+• 
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• * * 
THE COURT: The two oldest boys the 
Court would agree in talking to. 
After examining the children, apparently the children were 
again examined by the Trial Court. However, the Trial Court 
specifically held at pages 288 and 289: 
As to the objection paragraph numbered 3, it 
is true that the court examined the two 
oldest sons on two separate occasions prior 
to entering its decision; however, the court 
had made its determination of custody before 
examining the children the second time and 
confirmed with the two young men that such 
arrangements as set forth in the decree 
would be satisfactory with them as the court 
felt it was in their best interests to have 
such arrangement of joint custody. 
The only testimony from Defendant about custody is 
found at page 390 wherein Defendant testified: 
Q: You have physical custody of your 
two sons, Aaron and Marlow James, is that 
correct? 
A: That is correct. 
Q: You have had custody of those two 
children since when? 
A: I think it was probably the month 
of August. 
Q: And your relationship with those 
two children? 
A: A very good one. 
Q: What would you request that the 
Court do with regard to the custody of those 
children? 
A: I would like those children left in 
my custody. 
-22-
Q: Do you believe they wlould like to 
be in your custody? 
A: I do. 
There is some indication that the Defendant has been 
physically abusive to the minor children (R. 357) and that 
Defendant has made various promises to the children if they 
will come and live with him (R. 355-357)^ The Trial Court did 
not abuse the constitutional rights of pefendant. The Court 
simply, as per stipulation, interviewed the children and gave 
weight to their desires, 
POINT IV 
THERE IS NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION JN REQUIRING 
DEFENDANT TO GIVE PLAINTIFF tHE RIVIERA 
AUTOMOBILE• 
The analysis heretofore contained} in this brief of the 
distribution of the property of the marital estate discloses no 
abuse in the award. 
The testimony which was unrebutt^d was that Defendant 
sold Plaintifffs vehicle which was previously paid for by 
Plaintiff. The Riviera was the replacement vehicle for her 
prior automobile. It is obvious that Defendant plays fast and 
loose with titles to vehicles when it flits his needs. For 
example, Plaintiff testified at page 387: 
A: Yes. When he came and ^sked me if 
he could sell my Cordoba that l! had paid 
for, I told him he would not be able to sell 
it without my consent. I saidf "The car is 
not for sale. It's just what I wpit. It's 
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paid for. It's not for sale." And he said 
he was going to sell it anyway. And I saidf 
"You can't because I have the title." And 
he aidf "No, you don't. It has always been 
with Painter Motor Company." 
Q: So even though you had paid for the 
car it was titled in Painter Motor? 
A: Yes. 
Defendant testified at page 377: 
Q: Now Mrs. Painter is driving a Buick 
Riviera, is that correct? 
A: That is correct. 
Q: Who owns that vehicle? 
A: Painter Motor Company. 
Q: Have you made demand on Mrs. 
Painter in your capacity as a representative 
of Painter Motor for the return of that 
vehicle? 
A: I have. 
Q: Is that car going to be awarded to 
you some way or do you own it and it's just 
titled in Painter Motor? 
A: The car is not titled. It is still 
in inventory. I don't own the car. The 
Motor Company owns the car. 
The Trial Court, in making the property distribution, 
the award of alimony and child support, looked at the 
respective parties' earning capacities and the actualities of 
the respective parties' capabilities. Defendant was obviously 
earning substantially more than he declared. He constantly 
maneuvered assets between himself and Painter Motor. His "self 
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dealings11 did not mislead the Trial Court and there is no 
showing, nor can there be any showing, of an abuse of 
discretion by the Trial Court. 
POINT V 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO ATTORN^'S FEES AND 
COSTS. 
Plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees and costs for 
the necessary defense of this appeal. , The case should be 
remanded for an award of a reasonable fee| and costs. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion. The 
record reflects substantial evidence in support of the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the cgse should be affirmed 
in its entirety with a remand for a determination of a 
reasonable attorney's fee for Plaintiff in defending this 
appeal. 
DATED this ^ 2 day of December, 1987r 
JARDINE, LrNEBAUGH, BRO^ ft & DUNN 
JAM! 
Attorneysffor Plaintiff-
Respondent 
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